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THE DESECRATION OF THE FERGUSON MONUMENT
TRUST: THE NEED FOR WATCHDOG
LEGISLATION
LUIS KUTNER
INTRODUCTION
HE law of charitable trusts in this country is in dire need of
critical review. Many millions of dollars have been donated to
charitable trusts by public-minded citizens, only to have been
covertly used by the trustees or administrators for their own purposes.
Moreover, the present laws, both of Illinois and most other states, re-
garding charitable trusts, offer little or no protection for the intended
beneficiaries. The purpose of this article is to carefully examine one
case of clear abuse of a charitable trust, and to use that example as a
vehicle to demonstrate the inadequacy of the 1961 Illinois Charitable
Trust Act.
I. THE FERGUSON CASE
Upon his death in 1905, Mr. Benjamin F. Ferguson left substan-
tially all of his one million dollar estate in trust to be permanently
used for beautifying the City of Chicago through the erection of
statuary and artistic monuments. Naming the Northern Trust Com-
pany as trustee, the will stated:
My said Trustee after paying the bequests hereinabove mentioned and estab-
lishing or realizing and keeping intact a permanent trust fund of not less than
$1,000,000 shall annually thereafter or oftener, if required, pay the entire net in-
come arising therefrom (after deducting its compensation as Trustee herein
mentioned) to the Art Institute of Chicago, to be known as the B. F. Ferguson
Monument Fund and entirely and exclusively used and expended by it under
the direction of its Board of Trustees in the erection and maintenance of en-
during statuary and monuments, in the whole or in part of stone, granite, or
bronze, in the parks, along the boulevards, or in other public places within the
City of Chicago, Illinois, commemorating worthy men or women of America,
or important events in American history. The plans or designs for such statuary
Member, Illinois Bar; President, Commission for International Due Process of Law;
Author of Proposals of WoRLD HABEAS CoRPus, HABEAS PROPRIETATEM; author of
WORLD HABEAS CoRVus (Oceana, 1962); former Visiting Lecturer and Associate Profes-
sor, Yale Law School; Consul General of Guatemala. Assistance of Russell M. Pelton,
Jr., University of Chicago Law School, is acknowledged.
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or monuments and the location of the sanic shall he determined by the Board
of Trustees of such Institute.'
By this unprecedented gift to the people of Chicago, Benjamin Fer-
guson's will apparently assured Chicago's place among the world's
most beautiful cities. A Director of the Art Institute, William French,
was moved to declare, "The importance of this generous bequest to
Chicago as a city cannot be overestimated. It is a long step toward
making Chicago the city beautiful. ' 2 The Chicago Tribune headlined,
"Will of B. F. Ferguson Assures City Place Among World's Cities
Beautiful," and then stated,
No other city in the world has such a fund available as that left by Mr. Fer-
uson, and officials of the Art Institute, artists, and devotees of municipal art
reely predicted that the bequest would in another generation make Chicago
the richest city in the world in sculpture and the Mecca of artists.3
Two long-time friends of Ben Ferguson's played vital roles in Chi-
cago's obtaining this great bequest. One was Daniel Burnham, the re-
nowned city-planner, who convinced his friend Ferguson of the great
value of such a gift, and who later pointed out the role of the Fer-
guson Fund in Burnham's long range plan for Chicago thusly:
Quite in accord with the Plan of Chicago is the Benjamin Franklin Ferguson
Monument Fund of one million dollars the income of which is available for
defraying the cost of statuary commemorating worthy men and women of
America or important events in American history to be erected in the parks
and boulevards of the city under the direction of the trustees of the Art In-
stitute.4
The other was Charles Hutchinson, President of the Art Institute
Board, who assured Ferguson that by entrusting administration of his
Fund to the Art Institute Board he was insuring that the very best
sculpture would always be selected.
The will of B. F. Ferguson, through its creation of the Ferguson
Monument Fund, intended by clear language and intent and direction
that the people of the City of Chicago were specifically designated as
the true and only beneficiaries of the Fund that was designated to be
used for the creation of "enduring statuary monuments" within the
City of Chicago. Regarding the role of the Art Institute, a private in-
' Section s(e) of will (emphasis added). See also, Albright v. United States, 308 F. 2d
739, 743. (5th Cir. 1962). "The intent and purpose of the settlor is the law of trust."
2 Richey, Accused: The Art Institute, Focus/MIDWEST, Sept., 1962, pp. 8-9.
3 Chicago Daily Tribune, April 15, 1905, p, 2, col. 3.
4 BURNF-AM & BENNrr, Tiir PLAN OF CHICAGO 121 *(1909).
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stitution, it is to be noted that the income was not to be given to the
Institute, but only to be administered by the Art Institute in the erec-
tion of statuary in the City of Chicago.
In the years that followed Ben Ferguson's death, the Art Institute
Board, under the direction of Charles Hutchinson, did indeed channel
the trust income into the erection of several outstanding statues and
artistic monuments in Chicago.5 However, in 1924, with the death of
Charles Hutchinson, the erection of new statuary by the Art Institute
Board declined sharply. The mounting of a pair of equestrian Indians
in 1929 marked the Ferguson Fund's last contribution to the people of
Chicago.
What followed is perhaps the classic example of how the bene-
ficiaries of a charitable trust can be robbed of their intended benefits
through collusion among the parties expected to protect the benefi-
ciaries' interests. In the early 1930's the Art Institute began planning a
major expansion program. However, the depression greatly hampered
the Institute's fund raising from private individuals (its usual source
of revenue), and the Directors of the Art Institute began search-
ing about for new sources of cash. It was decided to attempt to seize
the income from the Ferguson Monument Fund; and, when the trus-
tee, the Northern Trust Company, offered no resistance, a financial
coup d'6tat was carefully planned and put into effect. On May 22,
1933, at 10:02 A.M. the Art Institute filed a Complaint in the Circuit
Court of Cook County,6 requesting the court to construe the language
of sub-paragraph 5 (e) of the B. F. Ferguson will so that the word
"monument" might include a building; specifically, an addition to the
Art Institute. This suit was filed quietly and without previous pub-
licity. At 10:04 A.M. on the same day the Attorney General's Answer
was filed, making only a nominal defense and conceding all the points
raised by the Art Institute. Minutes later, at 10:17, a seventeen-page
5 By 1929 the Ferguson Fund had financed, in whole or in part, the following monu-
ments: (1) The Fountain of the Great Lakes in Grant Park, adjacent to the south
terrace of the Art Institute; (2) Statue of the Republic in Jackson Park; (3) Alexander
Hamilton Monument in Grant Park; (4) Illinois Centennial Monument in Logan
Square; (5) Eugene Field Monument in Lincoln Park; (6) Fountain of Time on the
Midway, Jackson Park; (7) Theodore Thomas Memorial in Grant Park; (8) Washing-
ton Monument on the steps of the Art Institute; (9) Marquette Monument in Douglas
Park; (10) One of the sculptured bridge houses at Michigan Avenue and the Chicago
River; and (11) The two mounted American Indians at Congress Street and Michigan
Avenue. No public monuments of any significance have been financed by the Ferguson
Fund since 1929.
6 Art Institurc v. Kerner, Case No. B 269011 (1933).
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decree was entered declaring that the word "monument" in the Ben-
jamin Ferguson will could indeed include a building, and that the Art
Institute could use the accumulated and future income of the Fer-
guson Fund for the construction and maintenance of an addition to
the Institute. If these facts were not indicia enough of collusion, it was
subsequently discovered that the Art Institute's Complaint, the Attor-
ney General's Answer, and the court's Decree were all typed on the
same typewriter, all bore the same watermark, and the Attorney Gen-
eral's Answer was enclosed in the reversed blue backing of the Art
Institute's counsel. It is thus manifest that all three documents were
prepared by the Art Institute's counsel, Percy B. Eckhart, who 'was
himself a member of the Art Institute's Board. Moreover, although the
Decree referred to "the proof, oral, documentary and written, taken
and filed in said cause," in fact no witnesses were heard and no tran-
script of any proceedings appears in the court files; reinforcing the
suspicion of fraud.
Thus, in less than an hour the income of a great public charitable
trust for the City of Chicago was quietly channeled into the coffers
of a private corporation. Where the Art Institute had originally been
merely the administrator of the more than million dollar Ferguson
Fund, it had suddenly become the sole beneficiary. Because the Art
Institute decided to postpone construction of the museum addition
until a sizable fund had accumulated, the public became aware of its
loss only gradually. Several civic groups' requests for assistance in
erecting new sculptures were turned down in the 1930's and 1940's,'
slowly focusing attention on the fact that the Art Institute exclusively
was enjoying the benefit of the Ferguson Fund.
7 DRURY, OLD CHICAGO HOMES 192 (1941): "While a member of the West End
Woman's Club, Mrs. Brumback served on the committee seeking to obtain a statue for
the West Side out of the income of the million-dollar B. F. Ferguson Monument Fund.
The committee's request was turned down by the trustees of the Art Institute, admin-
istrators of the fund, on the ground that the money was needed to build an East Wing
on the Art Institute."
Another unsuccessful request is indicated in the minutes of a meeting of the Art
Institute's Ferguson Fund Committee on May 21, 1946, which state in part: "The
Museum of Science and Industry, through Mr. Van Deventer of their staff, has made
a request for assistance in erecting two statues on the North side of the building.
During the discussion, the following points were brought out: As the Ferguson Fund
has not been used to build any monuments or statues for many years, public criticism
might result if attention is not paid to the project suggested by the Museum of Science
and Industry .... The Chairman wished to emphasize that the final choice rests entirely
with the committee." Needless to say, the Museum of Science and Industry's request
was turned down on the ground that the Art Institute was saving the sculpture fund for
its building project.
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By 1955, $1,600,000 income had accumulated in the B. F. Ferguson
Monument Fund from the Ferguson Estate, and the Art Institute de-
cided to proceed with the curiously long-deferred construction of its
addition. Since the 1933 decree had sanctioned a museum building,
and it had been decided to construct an office wing in a slightly differ-
ent location instead, it was deemed prudent to again obtain court
affirmance of the same things that had been obtained in 1933 under
collusive circumstances. The general public was by now aware of the
Art Institute's scheme, and several parties, including the City of Chi-
cago itself, requested the new Attorney General, Latham Castle (now
a justice in the Circuit Court of Appeals), to enter a vigorous defense
to the Art Institute's petition. However, the Attorney General, whose
relative, Mrs. Byron Harvey, was on the woman's board of the Art
Institute, publicly declined to resist the Art Institute's petition, stating
that he felt himself bound by the earlier judgment.' After several
groups' petitions to intervene were denied, the Circuit Court of Cook
County decreed that, as requested by the Art Institute, the income
from the Ferguson Fund could be perpetually used for the construc-
tion and maintenance of the Art Institute's administrative wing.'
Subsequent suits'0 to vacate the two earlier decrees foundered on
the same point that had precluded the intervention of interested par-
ties in the Art Institute v. Castle case; i.e., it had previously been held
by the Illinois Courts that the Attorney General, as the "protector of
public charitable trusts," was the sole representative eligible to bring
suits concerning them."
Thus, the perversion of the Ferguson Monument Fund was com-
plete. Not only had tile administrators channeled the funds from a
8 Chicago Daily Tribune, May 21, 1955, p. 2: "Attorney General Latham Castle yes-
terd'ay rejected a request that he prepare a vigorous rather than a nominal defense to
a Circuit Court suit in which the Art Institute seeks authority to use accumulated income
from a trust fund to build a $1,200,000 addition to its building.
"Castle said his opposition would be only nominal, in his capacity as representative of
the people, because the court in 1933 approved use of the funds for an extension to the
building, and the present suit was necessary only because the Institute has revised its
,building plans."
9 Art Institute v. Castle, Case No. 55 C 249 (1955).
10 The most recent such suit being Greene v. Art Institute, 16 I1. App. 2d 84, 147 N.E.
2d 415 (1958).
11 People ex rel. Courtney v. Wilson, 327 II. App. 231, 63 N.E. 2d 794 (1945). Inter-
estingly, this was another case in which the Art Institute of Chicago was alleged to have
abused a charitable trust in its care; the sum involved this time was $300,000.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
public to a private use, but the premeditated fraud had indeed been
given judicial sanction.'2
II. ILLINOIS LAW ENCOURAGED THE ABUSE
OF THE FERGUSON FUND
The Ferguson case is worthy of careful analysis for several reasons.
First of all, a study of the Art Institute's tactics in commandeering the
Ferguson Monument Fund reveals several major flaws in the charita-
ble trust legislation of most states. Secondly, the case demonstrates
how even the most precise, explicit standards in a charitable trust doc-
ument can be circumvented by a trustee or administrator determined
to alter the use of the trust.
Illinois law has long recognized that a court of general equity juris-
diction has the power to authorize deviation from the terms of a
trust.13 However, it is equally well recognized that the court must
make two specific findings before it may authorize such a deviation:
(1) Changed circumstances not anticipated by the creator of the trust;
and
(2) Some exigency resulting from such changed circumstances which makes
deviation from the terms of the trust indispensable to the preservation of
the trust estate or to the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust in
the case of some other necessity of the most urgent character. 14
It is therefore obvious, as it must have been to the Directors of the
Art Institute in 1933, that should the Art Institute petition for per-
mission to deviate from the original terms of the Ferguson Trust, the
two above-mentioned criteria would have to be met. Knowing that it
would be extremely difficult to even nominally maintain that the trust
estate was currently in danger or that the beneficiaries would suffer
great hardship without a deviation, the Art Institute was hesitant to
initiate such an action.
The Art Institute got around this stumbling-block in the Illinois
law quite easily, however. Rather than petition for permission to de-
viate from the terms of the trust, the Art Institute simply petitioned
12 Notwithstanding the refusal of the Illinois courts to recognize the patent fraud
committed in the Ferguson case, civic groups, notably the Chicago Heritage Commit-
tee, are still campaigning to restore the B. F. Ferguson Monument Fund to its intended
use in beautifying the City of Chicago.
13The leading Illinois case is Curtiss v. Brown, 29 Ill. 201 (1862). See also ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 148, S 32.1(b) (1961).
14 From a summary of the Illinois trust law in Tlhigpen, Basis for Deviation of Pre-
1941 Trusts, 50 ILL. BAR J. 1102 (1962).
DESECRATION OF THE FERGUSON IONUMENT TRUST ZZ5
to have the terms of the trust document reconstrued. Illinois courts of
equity have great leeway in the construction they may place-on.the
terms of trust documents, even if the effect of the construction is in
fact to authorize considerable deviation from the original terms of the
trust document.
When the Art Institute petitioned the Circuit Court of Cook
County whether the words "enduring monuments" in the B. F. Fer-
guson will could be construed to include an addition to the Art Insti-
tute itself, the necessary implication was that the questioned phrase
was ambiguous and difficult to understand. Whether that was in fact
the case is important because it is directly relevant to the charge that
the Board of the Art Institute acted with fraudulent intent and with-
out good faith in altering the use of the Ferguson Funds.
First of all, it is of great significance that prior to 1933, the Art In-
stitute had never maintained or even suggested that the terms of the
trust were the least bit difficult to understand. Indeed, the ease and
regularity with which the Institute had administered the funds for
twenty-eight years is strong evidence that the terms of the trust were
quite clear.
No will or document can be interpreted equitably unless the inter-
preter understands the language as used at the time of the writing.
When on the 25th of November, 1904, Benjamin F. Ferguson drew
up his Last Will and Testament, he designated specifically that the
Fund be used for the creation of "enduring statuary and monuments."
In this regard it is highly significant that during Benjamin Ferguson's
lifetime there was not a single building listed in the official records of
Chicago as an "enduring monument" to be protected from destruc-
tion in the process of city development, although there were numer-
ous libraries, exhibition halls, and museums (including the Art In-
stitute) in existence at that time. This fact is important because it
indicates at the least what Benjamin Ferguson intended that his money
not be used for.
There appears to have been no confusion on the part of Ben Fer-
guson's contemporaries as to the meaning of "enduring monuments"
as used in the trust document. On September 9, 1913, Charles L.
Hutchinson, then President of the Art Institute, as well as of the B. F.
Ferguson Fund, made an address at the dedication of the "Fountain of
the Great Lakes," the first statue financed by the Ferguson Fund, in
Grant Park on the south side of the Art Institute in which he stated:
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During his life among us, Mr. Ferguson was a modest, unassuming citizen, de-
voting most of his time to his business but, as with many other businessmen.
his thoughts were not all given to commercial life. He was a dreamer of
dreams.
He had visions of a City Beautiful and a strong desire to aid in the upbuilding
of such a city. He saw that it was within his power to be of material service in
the building of such a city here at home, and he resolved to act and to act
generously. It was to create a fund of at least one million dollars, the proceeds
of which should forever be devoted to the realization of his dream.
Future generations ... will wonder at the farsighted wisdom of this man, who
loved his fellow men and sought to be of service to them-sought not only to
minister to esthetic sense, but to arouse their patriotism as well. 15
The clarity of Ben Ferguson's bequest has been further pointed out as
follows:
Now, this professed lack of comprehension of the will's terminology is puz-
zling in as much as the Art Institute at the time of the bequest commended
Mr. Ferguson for making his intent so clear. Newton H. Carter, then Art In-
stitute secretary, told the Chicago Tribune that prior to his death Mr. Ferguson
had 'called on the officers of the Institute with his attorney' and explained his
bequest to them. 'Mr. Ferguson said he had traveled in Europe constantly and
was struck by the impressiveness of art works in the parks and along the
boulevards. He said he regretted that Chicago should be so far behind other
municipalities and wished the money expended with a view to filling the void.'
Art Institute Director William French was quoted in the Tribune as saying:
'The provisions of the will are so direct and clear that only works in marble,
granite, or bronze of the highest type may be purchased." 6
All these facts were available to both the Art Institute and the Cir-
cuit Court of Cook County in 1933, when the Board of the Art Insti-
tute complained that it was unable to fully comprehend the meaning
of the term "enduring monuments." These facts lead irresistibly to
the conclusion that Ben Ferguson intended his money to be used for
the creation of statues and works of art throughout the City of Chii-
cago, not the construction of a single, privately-owned building.
But if the facts do lead so "irresistibly" to the conclusion suggested
above, then how in good faith could the Circuit Court of Cook
County have decreed that the phrase "enduring monuments" as used
by Ben Ferguson included an addition to a private museum? The an-
swer might lie in part in the words "good faith," for it has already
been demonstrated that there was evident collusion between the at-
torney for the Art Institute, the Attorney General, and the Circuit
Court itself in regard to the 1933 case. But to a far greater degree, the
actions of the Circuit Court of Cook County throughout the Ferguson
M, Men and Events, Dec., 1948, p. 6.
16Supra note 2 at p. 11.
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case can be best explained by the Illinois law itself, which prohibited
any party from contesting the Art Institute's scheme to pirate the
Ferguson Funds.
Although the Illinois Statutes were silent with regard to Charitable
Trusts throughout the Ferguson cases, the governing rules had been
laid down by the Illinois Courts over a long period of time. The Illi-
nois Appellate Court, in People ex rel. Courtney v. Wilson,17 has
stated the rule thusly:
The authorities are in accord that the right of the people of the State, speak-
ing through their duly authorized officials, the state's attorney or the attorney
general, is exclusive, and that having this right and duty, their representative
has the right to control the case. Hesing v. Attorney General, 104 'Il. 292;
Stowell v. Prentiss, 323 Ill. 309. This doctrine is so firmly imbedded in the law
of this State that the Supreme Court has not only refused to permit anyone
other than the authorized representatives of the people to appear in court to
enforce a charitable or public trust, but has invariably gone behind the mere
name or cloak of the people and dismissed a case where it has appeared that
the real party in interest is some individual seeking to further a personal cause.
People ex rel. Moloney v. General Elec. Ry. Co., 172 I11. 129; Hunt v. Le
Grand Roller Skating Rink Co., 143 11. 118.18
Under this rule it is impossible for any party, other than the Attor-
ney General or the state's attorney, to attempt to enforce a charitable
trust. Thus, not even the beneficiaries of a charitable trust have a
standing in court, but are wholly dependent upon the Attorney Gen-
eral's office in the enforcement of their trust. When the Attorney
General chooses not to enforce the trust, as happened in the Ferguson
case, the beneficiary is left entirely without legal remedy. Not only is
the beneficiary barred from initiating an action to enforce a charitable
trust, but the Illinois Appellate Court held in Art Institute of Chicago
v. Castle,"' a suit ancillary to the Ferguson case, that the beneficiary
may not even intervene in an already pending suit involving the use of
the trust funds.
That this rule is not only inequitable but verily invites fraud is mani-
fest. Yet in spite of the dubious nature of this Illinois rule on the en-
forcement of Charitable Trusts, it was twice invoked to prevent citi-
zens' groups from contesting the Art Institute's attempt to seize the
Ferguson Funds.20 In view of the Attorney General's continued re-
17 327 111. App. 231, 163 N.E. 2d 794 (1945).
Is Id. at 243 (emphasis added).
19 9 111. App. 2d 473, 133 N.E. 2d 748 (1956).
.0 The National Sculpture Society and the Chicago Chapter of Artists Equity filed
scparatc pctitions to intcrvenc in the 1955 case. Both pctitions were dcnied.
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fusal to contest the Art Institute's complaint, denial of the petitions
to intervene was tantamount to a default award of the Ferguson Mon-
ument Funds to the Art Institute. It was hardly necessary to go
through the motions of the remainder of the suit, for the result had
already been determined.
Indeed, the inequities wrought by the Illinois rule that only the At-
torney General could enforce charitable trusts were noted by at least
one of the judges who enforced that rule. Superior Court Judge Abra-
ham Marovitz, after dismissing the taxpayer's suit brought by Wesley
Greene to enforce the Ferguson Trust,21 told the Art Institute's
counsel:
I have read the entire case of 1933 and all the papers and articles relating to
the matter, as well as Mr. Ferguson's will made in 1904 and probated in 1905,
and I cannot agree that Ferguson intended for the income from his money to
be used to erect an administration building.22
Shortly thereafter, Judge Marovitz met in his chambers with the
author and the Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago for the
purpose of discussing the Illinois charitable trust law. The decision
reached at that meeting was that Illinois law regarding charitable
trusts needed a drastic overhaul. Judge Marovitz urged passage of a
law which would permit a taxpayer to challenge the use of charitable
trust funds.
On the basis of Judge Marovitz's recommendation and the adverse
publicity created by the Ferguson case, the Illinois Legislature enacted
a Charitable Trust Act effective July 31, 1961.23 In its final form,
however, the Illinois Charitable Trust Act was patterned after a uni-
form act which had already proven to be ill-conceived,24 and thus
failed to provide any of the safeguards which the Ferguson case re-
vealed as being so necessary.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ILLINOIS CHARITABLE
TRUST AcT OF 1961
Legislation designed to enforce ordinary trusts is not effective for
the purpose of enforcing charitable trusts. It is a basic premise of or-
21 Greene v. Art Institute, 16 111. App. 2d 84, 147 N.E. 2d 415 (1958).
22 Quoted in Richey, Accused: The Art Institute, Focus/MIDWEsT, Sept. 1962, p. 8, 12.
23 Laws of Illinois Vol. 11, Charitable Trust Act 1961, § 6, p. 2094.
24 Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act, 9c UNIFORM LAWS
ANNOT. 208-215 (1954). That the Uniform Act fails to adequately solve the problems
inherent in charitable trust enforcement is evidenced by the fact that the Act has been
fully enacted by only one state, California, since it was drafted in 1954.
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dinary trust legislation that abuses of the trust will be quickly con-
tested by the beneficiaries and other interested parties. Charitable
trusts, however, lack this built-in protective device because of the
simple fact that the beneficiaries are often defined in vague or indef-
inite terms. Indeed, it has been said that indefiniteness of beneficiaries
is an essential feature of a charitable trust.25 Thus, lacking the alert-
ness of clear self-interest, most citizens, even those within the intended
classes of beneficiaries, are impervious to abuses of charitable trusts.
The need for legislation specifically designed to protect and en-
force charitable trusts has long been recognized by both commenta-
tors26 and the Commission of Uniform State Laws which drafted the
abortive Uniform Supervision of Charitable Trusts Act in 1954. The
Ferguson case vividly spotlighted the need for enforcement legislation
in Illinois.
With an eye to preventing abuses of charitable trusts such as oc-
curred in the Ferguson case, as well as possible outright embezzle-
ment, an analysis of the charitable trust laws of the several states indi-
cates that there are four principal criteria which any truly effective
charitable trust legislation must meet: (1) all charitable trusts must be
registered with some designated state officer; (2) trustees must be re-
quired to submit regular reports of the financial activity of all charita-
ble trusts; (3) the Act must have effective enforcement provisions,
and (4) the beneficiaries of charitable trusts must have some recog-
nized standing in court. Following is an analysis of the degree to
which the Illinois Charitable Trust Act of 1961 meets each of these
four criteria.
REGISTRATION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS
The most elementary method of control and enforcement of char-
itable trust is to require that all such trusts be registered with the
state. Although merely registering the existence of a charitable trust
in no way guarantees that it will not be abused, registration is an es-
sential first step of any enforcement procedure. The usual registration
provision is that every trustee subject to the act must file with the ap-
propriate state agency a copy of the instrument providing for his title,
powers or duties. Not only does registration provide a floor upon
25 Kerner v. Thompson, 365 I1. 149,6 N.E. 2d 131 (1937).
26 See, e.g., Bogert, Proposed Legislation Regarding State Supervision of Charities,
52 Micn. L. REv. 633 (1954); D'Amours, Control of Charitable Trusts, 84 TRus.rs AND
Esraxrh.s 345 (1947).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
which effective enforcement machinery can be built, but it also tends
to make trustees conscious of their public responsibility.
The importance of registration to an effective charitable trust en-
forcement program has been explained thusly:
[P]rior to the enactment of the Charitable Trusts Act the Attorney General
was severely handicapped in carrying out his duties relating to charitable trusts
by his complete lack of knowledge of their existence. It is inconceivable that
any efficient or sustained program could be developed to enforce charitable
trusts and thereby protect the public for whom their benefits were intended
without there being some plan for making information available to the person
charged with the enforcement duty.2 7
The registration provision of the Illinois Charitable Trust Act is as
follows:
Section 6. Every trustee subject to this Act who has received property for
charitable purposes shall file with the Attorney General, within 6 months after
any part of the income or principal is received for application to the charitable
purpose, a copy of the instrument providing for his title, powers or duties. If
any part of the income or principal is authorized or required to be applied to a
charitable purpose at the time this Act takes effect, the filing shall be made
within 6 months thereafter. 28
Illinois is thus one of only ten states29 which recognize the importance
of registration in the enforcement of charitable trusts.
There are, however, two noteworthy exceptions to the general re-
quirement of registration of charitable trusts under the new Illinois
law. The first, granted in Section 4,30 states that the Act does not ap-
27 Klapp & Wertz, Supervision of The Ohio Charitable Trusts Act, 18 Omiio Sr. L. J.
181 (1957).
28 Illinois Charitable Trust Act, IL. LAWS, 1961, S 6, p. 2095.
2 The statutes of three states, New Hampshire, Ohio and Rhode Island,, provide
simply that all charitable trusts must be registered by the trustees with a designated
state bureau (usually a Division of Charitable Trusts, under the Attorney General). All
the other states which require registration of charitable trusts specify a time period
within which the registration must be made. Iowa, Nevada and New Mexico, for ex-
ample, require that the trustees register all charitable trusts within thirty days after
receiving the trust property; while the trustees are given sixty days to register in both
Michigan and South Carolina. Of all the states requiring registration within a specified
period California and Illinois are most liberal, allowing the trustees six months after
receiving the trust property in which to register.
30 Section 4. This Act does not apply . . . to a corporation sole, or other rcligious
corporation, trust or organization which holds property for religious, charitable, hos-
pital or educational purposes, for the purpose. of operating cemeteries or a home or
homes for the aged; nor to any agency or organization, incorporated or unincorporated,
affiliated with and directly supervised by such a religious corporation or organization;
nor to an officer, director or trustee of any such religious corporation, trust or organ-
ization who holds property in his official capacity for like purposes; nor to a charitable
organization, foundation, trust or corporation organized and operated for educational
or hospital purposes or for the purpose of operating a cemetery or cemeteries, or a
home or homes for the aged.
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ply to any religious groups nor to a "charitable organization, foun-
dation, trust or corporation organized and operated for educational
or hospital purposes." Although exclusions of this breadth are fairly
standard in charitable trust legislation, they are subject to criticism on
the ground that they exclude some organizations and activities most
requiring protective surveillance.
The second exception to the registration requirement is expressed in
Section 2:
This Act applies to all trustees holding property for charitable purposes under
any written trust the corpus of which has a value in excess of $4,000, and over
which the Attorney General has enforcement or supervisory powers.
Illinois is unique among the states in establishing a minimum size of
trusts covered by the charitable trust act. As the Illinois Act was
passed in 1961, the wisdom of the provision is yet to be adequately
tested, but in view of the fact that the Illinois Division of Charitable
Trusts has more than one and one-half billion dollars in charitable
trusts under its supervision,3 this would seem to be an effective and
logical way of minimizing the paper work of the agency.
Thus, the Illinois Charitable Trust Act on the whole satisfies the
first criteria of effective charitable legislation by requiring the regis-
tration of most (though not all) such trusts.
REQUIRED REGULAR REPORTS
A second basic means of controlling and enforcing charitable trusts
is to require that the trustees make regular reports of the financial
activity of their respective trusts to a designated state authority. Such
reports often enable regulatory agencies to pinpoint and correct abuses
in the administration of charitable trusts before the abuses have in fact
destroyed the trusts. Moreover, just as required registration tends to
make trustees conscious of their public responsibility, the requirement
of making regular reports tends to keep trustees conscious of that
responsibility.
The Illinois Charitable Trust Act of 1961, like the legislation in
many other states3 2 generally requires trustees of charitable trusts to
31 Interview with Asst. Ill. Arty. Gen. Martin Handleman, Director of Charitable
Trusts, Oct. 10, 1962 (Chicago).
32 At the present time nineteen other states have statutory provisions which require
the regular auditing of the financial records of charitable trusts. In sixteen of these
states (California, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nevada, New
IHanipshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin) the trustees are required to file annual reports
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file regular reports. The requirement is established in section 7 (a) of
the Act as follows:
Section 7. (a) Except as otherwise provided, every trustee subject to this Act
shall, in addition to filing copies of the instruments previously required, file
with the Attorney General periodic written reports under oath, setting forth
information as to the nature of the assets held for charitable purposes and the
administration thereof by the trustee, in accordance with rules and regulation
of the Attorney General.
The "periodic" report required in section 7 (a) has been more spe-
cifically defined as "annual" by the Attorney General's Rules and
Regulations for the Administration of Charitable Trusts in Illinois.88
Illinois has a unique exception to its requirement that the trustees of
charitable trusts file annual reports. That exception is that no report
is required of a trust which is the subject of a pending adversary pro-
ceeding. 4 The justification for this exception is that the trust entity
has not yet been determined.
There is another very significant exception to the requirement set
forth in Section 7 (a). Illinois, like both California85 and South Caro-
lina,86 grants all banks and trust companies acting as trustees of char-
itable trusts an exemption from the requirement of filing annual re-
ports.8 7 Because banks and trust companies are the trustees in the vast
with some state agency. The appropriate agency is uniformly designated by the states
either as one subordinate to the Attorney General, or as the clerk of the court having
jurisdiction over the trust. The trustees are required to file biennial reports in Ohio
and "periodic" reports in Michigan. The final state in this category is Wyoming. Al-
though Wyoming does not require the trustees themselves to file reports, it does pro-
vide that the State Examiner must annually examine the books of all charitable trusts.
WYo. GEN. STAT. tit. 9, § 104 (1957). The Wyoming State Examiner informs us that
he obtains his information for a current list of charitable trusts from the Clerk of
Court records.
8 8 RuLEs & REGULATIONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS IN ILLINOIS
§ 5 (effective Jan. 30, 1962).
34 Illinois Charitable Trust Act, ILL. LAWS, 1961, § 7-e, p. 2097.
38 CALIF. CoDE ANN., Government, 5S 12580-96 (1955).
36S. C. CODE, S S67-81 to 85 (1962).
37 LAws OF ILLINOIS (1961), Charitable Trust Act, § 6: "Every trustee subject to
this Act who has received property for charitable purposes shall file with the Attorney
General, within 6 months after any part of the income or principal is received for
application to the charitable purpose, a copy of the instrument providing for his
title, powers or duties. ... Upon complying with the requirement of this Section,
Banks and Trust Companies, authorized to accept and execute trusts in this State, and
an individual or individuals duly appointed, qualified and acting as co-fiduciary or
co-fiduciaries with any such Bank or Trust Company, shall he exempt from all other
provsions aind reilIireucirts of this Act."
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majority of charitable trusts, exempting them from the regulatory
legislation thoroughly emasculates the Charitable Trust Act. The ra-
tionale for this exemption is presumably that banking institutions are
already under so much supervision that any abuse in the administra-
don of a charitable trust would be easily detectable, without the in-
convenience of requiring banks and trust companies to file additional
reports. This argument, however, has recently been subjected to
heavy criticism. One noted commentator has stated:
That the examinations by the Superintendent and Comptroller were found
'limited in scope and inadequate for their purposes . . .' was indicated in a let-
ter from the California attorney general's office stating that they 'contemplate
introducing legislation in the next session of the legislature to require banks to
file annual reports with the attorney general on their administration of these
trusts.138
Moreover, it is to be noted that in the case of the Ferguson Monu-
ment Trust the gross abuse of that charitable trust was carried on with
the tacit approval of the trustee, the Northern Trust Company. In the
litigation associated with the Ferguson case, neither the state nor fed-
eral banking authorities took any part, much less attempted to enforce
the trust. Thus, the Ferguson case amply demonstrates not only that
banking institutions may occasionally become involved in the abuse of
charitable trusts, but also that the ordinary state and federal supervi-
sion of banking institutions offers little or no protection against such
abuses. To thus exempt banks and trust companies from the Illinois
Charitable Trust Act not only creates the erroneous impression that
charitable trusts are under tight state control but also renders the Act
almost nugatory.
ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS
Irrespective of what other provisions it may contain, a charitable
trust act is only as effective as its enforcement provisions make it.
Without adequate enforcement provisions, the most elaborate and
far-reaching charitable trust statute is at best an empty gesture. In ex-
amining the enforcement provisions of a charitable trust act there are
two questions to be considered; first, does the act provide for the en-
forcement of its own regulatory provisions; and secondly, does the act
provide for the enforcement of the charitable trusts themselves.
Considering the former question first, although the Illinois Charita-
8 D'Amours, Statc Supervision of Charities: Present Status, 4 N. J-l. BAR J. 76,
81 (1962).
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ble Trust Act of 1961 requires the registration of all charitable trusts,
there is no statutory provision specifically designed to enforce that
"requirement." Neither the Act nor the Attorney General's Rules es-
tablish any penalty for a trustee who fails to register a charitable trust.
Section 12 of the Act, which states that "[t]he Attorney General may
institute appropriate proceedings to secure compliance with this Act,"
provides the only basis for enforcement of the registration require-
ment, but it presumably threatens uncooperative trustees with nothing
more serious than removal for non-compliance.
Illinois is not alone, however, in its failure to enforce the registra-
tion requirement of its charitable trust act. Of the ten states which
require registration, Ohio is the only one which has enacted an effec-
tive enforcement provision. The Ohio Code provides that for failing
to register a charitable trust, a trustee is subject to a fine of not less
than $500 nor more than $10,000, or a prison term of not less than
one month nor more than one year, or both. 9 Considering the great
sums of money often involved, the Ohio provision would appear to be
none too strict.
Insofar as the requirement of filing annual reports is concerned,
under the Illinois Charitable Trust Act not only are the vast majority
of trustees (i.e., banks and trust companies) exempted, but the Act has
virtually no enforcement provisions for those trustees who are re-
quired to file annual reports. Again, section 12 of the Act can be con-
strued as granting the Attorney General the power to remove un-
cooperative trustees for non-compliance, but this would hardly be a
threat to a trustee seeking to conceal the misappropriation of a large
sum of money. A truly effective enforcement provision is typified by
the Wyoming statute which subjects trustees found giving false infor-
mation to the state examiner to a fine of $1,000 to $5,000 and impris-
onment of one to five years.40
A greater test of the effectiveness of charitable trust legislation,
however, is whether or not the act specifically provides for the en-
forcement of the charitable trusts themselves, or establishes penalties
for trustees found abusing their position of trust. Indeed, enforcing
the trust donor's intent should be the main objective of any charitable
trust legislation and the principal criterion of the effectiveness of any
such statute.
3 9 BALDWIN'S Oio REv. CODM ANNro. tit. 1, 109.99 (1953).
40 \Tyo. GEN. STATS., S 9-108 (1957).
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The only enforcement provision of this type in the Illinois Charita-
ble Trust Act is that the Attorney General is specifically authorized
to investigate the administration of charitable trusts if he so desires. 1
While this type of provision hardly insures compliance with the trust
donor's intent, it at least provides some basis for enforcement. As the
Illinois Act has been only recently enacted, however, it remains to be
seen whether the Attorney General will conduct an active program
of investigation with the objective of enforcing the provisions of trust
instruments.
Several states have provisions in their charitable trust acts specif-
ically designed to enforce the trust donors' intent (besides merely au-
thorizing investigations), and if the drafters of the Illinois Act had
profited from their example the final draft of the Illinois Act might
well have had more impact on the enforcement of trusts than it does.
For example, trustees are required to post bonds before assuming their
trust duties in Connecticut 4 2 (unless a bond is expressly repudiated in
the trust instrument) and in Florida43 (upon petition of any interested
party). In North Carolina the Attorney General may, upon sugges-
tion of two reputable citizens, demand an accounting of the trustee;44
five other states expressly grant the power to bring legal actions for
the enforcement of charitable trusts to the Attorney General. 5
Thus, although the Illinois Charitable Trust Act of 1961 does have
limited enforcement provisions, both for its own regulations and for
the trusts themselves, this is an area in which the Act should be con-
siderably strengthened.
BENEFICIARIES' STANDING IN COURT
In the law of trusts, a problem peculiar to charitable trusts is that
of the standing of the trust beneficiaries in court. All jurisdictions rec-
ognize that the beneficiary of an ordinary trust has the right to initi-
ate legal action (even if in the trustee's name) seeking the enforce-
ment of that trust. This principle tends to break down, however, with
41 LAWS OF ILLINOIS, Charitable Trust Act, § 9 (1961).
42 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANOT., ch. 780, § 45-83 (1960).
43 FLA. STATS., S 737.11 (1959).
44 GEN. STATS. OF N. C., art. 4, § 36-20 (1950).
45Michigan (Public Acts of 1961, Act No. 101, app'd., May 26, 1961, § 11); Ohio
(supra note 39, § 109, 24); South Carolina (S. C. CODE, § 67-83); Tennessee (TENN.
STAT., S 23-2802); and Wisconsin (IVis. STAT., § 231.34 (1)). Michigan also authorizes
the Attorney General to conduct an investigation of any charitable trust (supra, § 8).
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charitable trusts because of the usually vague or indefinite identifica-
don of the beneficiaries in the trust document. The problem is that it
is often difficult, if not impossible, to determine precisely who should
legally represent the beneficiaries of a charitable trust.
At common law, the King as parens patriae could institute a suit in
chancery by his Attorney General to enforce a charitable trust. In this
country, since the common law validity of charitable trusts was rec-
ognized in Vidal v. Executors of the Estate of Stephen Girard,46 it has
been repeatedly held that the Attorney General is the sole party with
standing to enforce a charitable trust in the absence of legislation to
the contrary.47 The exclusive nature of the Attorney General's en-
forcement power, long recognized by the Illinois courts, 48 was what
prevented any other party from enforcing the B. F. Ferguson charita-
ble trust.
However, in spite of the fact that a major cause for new charitable
trust legislation in Illinois was Judge Marovitz's desire that beneficiar-
ies of charitable trusts be granted standing in court, and in spite of the
fact that several other states have enacted legislation which grants the
beneficiaries of charitable trusts standing in court,49 the final draft of
46 43 U.S. (2 Howard) 126 (1844).
47 See, e.g., Agan v. United States National Bank, 227 Or. 619, 363 P. 2d 765 (1961);
In re Pruner's Estate, 390 Pa. 529, 136 A. 2d 107 (1957); Kennen v. State, 174 Wash.
19, 24 P. 2d 403 (1933). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRusTs, S 391.
48 See, e.g., Stowell v. Prentiss, 323 Ill. 309, 154 N.E. 120 (1926); People ex rel.
Courtney v. Wilson, 327 111. App. 231, 63 N.E. 2d 794 (1945).
49 There are six states in which the beneficiaries of a charitable trust have some rec-
ognized standing in court.
Wisconsin is most explicit in this regard. Although sec. 231.34 (1) of the Wisconsin
Statutes provides that the Attorney General may bring an action in the name of the
state by any ten or more "interested" parties. Section 231.34 (3) then defines an "in-
terested" party as a donor to the trust or a member or prospective member of the
class for the benefit of which the trust was established.
Art. 16, sec. 195-196 of the 1957 Maryland Code and sec. 3502 of the West Virginia
Code provide that suits to enforce or alter charitable trusts may be brought by the
trustee, by the Attorney General, or by any "interested" party. An "interested" party
is, however, not defined.
The Code of Virginia, sec. 55-26 to 55-34 (1950), is not only the most unusual but
also the most ambiguous of the statutes in this category. It provides that a suit may be
maintained against the trustee of a charitable trust in the name of the Commonwealth
only when there is "no other party capable of maintaining such suit." This statement
is not further clarified by either other provisions of the Code of Virginia or by the
case law, but it could be construed to mean that any beneficiary could initiate an
enforcement suit.
Finally, :there are two states, Nevada and New Mexico, which have enacted the
Uniform Trustees.' Accounting Act, and expresly made it applicable to charitable
trusts; in. lieu of a Charitable Trust Act, per se. The Nevada statute provides that
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the Illinois Charitable Trust Act of 1961 is completely silent on that
subject. The failure of the Legislature to enable beneficiaries to en-
force charitable trusts is inexplainable, and certainly must be consid-
ered one of the major omissions of the Charitable Trust Act.
CONCLUSION
Through the preceding analysis it has been the author's intention to
spotlight the major weaknesses of the Illinois Charitable Trust Act of
1961. These flaws, which indeed render the Act practically impotent,
can be summarized as follows: (1) banks and trust companies, trustees
of the vast majority of charitable trusts, are exempted from filing an-
nual reports; (2) the Act's enforcement provisions are minimal; and
(3) beneficiaries have no standing in court to enforce charitable
trusts.50 Thus, the Illinois Charitable Trust Act is devoid of those
safeguards which the Ferguson case revealed as being so necessary.
This means that a fraud, such as was perpetrated upon the people of
Chicago by the trustees of the Art Institute, is just as possible now as
it was in 1933.
ADDENDUM
Since the completion of the above article there have been several
new developments in the Ferguson case. Responding to the civic cam-
paign led by the Chicago Heritage Committee and Artists Equity
Association of Chicago, Illinois' energetic and capable new Attorney-
General, William G. Clark, initiated a fresh inquiry into the adminis-
tration of the Ferguson Monument Fund by the Art Institute.
Attorney-General Clark re-examined the facts of the Ferguson case
and conducted a series of conferences with all interested parties. The
Directors of the Art Institute of Chicago, through their attorneys,
agreed that the accumulated income from the principal of the Fer-
guson Monument Fund of $1,000,000 would be used to erect statuary
in the City of Chicago in accordance with the express intention of the
late Benjamin F. Ferguson.
This development not only restores the B. F. Ferguson Monument
beneficiaries' documents shall be delivered to the Attorney General; but sec. 165.190
states that any beneficiary may apply to the district court for an order requiring the
trustee to perform his trust duties. The New Mexico statute, § 33-2-1 to 33-2-24, is
practically identical.
5o These objectionable features of the Charitable Trust Act are corrected in a
Revised Illinois Charitable Trust Act which appears in the Appendix.
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Fund to the use intended by its donor, i.e., the beautification of the
City of Chicago's streets, boulevards and parks, but also demonstrates
that even the weak Illinois Charitable Trust Act of 1961 can be ef-
fective in the hands of conscientious and dedicated public servants.
This does not, however, diminish the need for a stronger, revised Illi-
nois Charitable Trust Act, an act which would not depend on the
men enforcing it for its effectiveness. (December 1, 1962)
APPENDIX
PROPOSED REVISED ILLINOIS CHARITABLE TRUST ACT*
An Act providing for the reporting of and the enforcement of certain
charitable trusts.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the
General Assembly:
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the Revised Charitable Trust Act.
SECTION 2. This Act applies to all trustees holding property for charita-
ble purposes under any written trust the corpus of which has a value in
excess of $4,000, and over which the Attorney General has enforcement
or supervisory powers.
SECTiON 3. "Trustee" means (a) any individual, group of individuals,
corporation, or other legal entity holding property in trust pursuant to
any charitable trust, (b) any corporation which has accepted property to
be used for a particular charitable corporate purpose as distinguished from
the general purposes of the corporation, or (c) any corporation formed
or operating for the administration of a charitable trust.
SECTION 4. This Act does not apply to the United States, any State, ter-
ritory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or to any of their agencies or governmen-
tal subdivision; nor to a corporation sole, or other religious corporation,
trust or organization which holds property for religious, charitable, hos-
pital or educational purposes, for the purpose of operating cemeteries or
a home or homes for the aged; nor to any agency or organization, incor-
porated or unincorporated, affiliated with and directly supervised by such
a religious corporation or organization; nor to an officer, director or trus-
tee of any such religious corporation, trust or organization who holds
property in his official capacity for like purposes; nor to a charitable or-
ganization, foundation, trust or corporation organized and operated for
educational or hospital purposes or for the purpose of operating a ceme-
tery or cemeteries, or a home or homes for the aged.
SECTION 5. The Attorney General shall establish and maintain a register
* Additions to the Illinois Charitable Trust Act of 1961 are italicized. Portions of the
1961 Act eliminated are indicated by brackets.
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or trustees subject to this Act and of the particular trust or other relation-
ship under which they hold property for charitable purposes and, to that
end, shall conduct whatever investigation is necessary, and shall obtain
from public records, court officers, taxing authorities, trustees and other
sources, copies of instruments, reports and records and whatever infor-
mation is needed for the establishment and maintenance of the register.
SECTION 6. (a) Every trustee subject to this Act who has received prop-
erty for charitable purposes shall file with the Attorney General, within 6
months after any part of the income or principal is received for applica-
tion to the charitable purpose, a copy of the instrument providing for his
title, powers or duties. If any part of the income or principal is authorized
or required to be applied to a charitable purpose at the time this Act takes
effect, the filing shall be made within 6 months thereafter. [Upon com-
plying with the requirement of this Section, Banks and Trust Companies,
authorized to accept and execute trusts in this State, and an individual or
individuals duly appointed, qualified and acting as co-fiduciary or co-
fiduciaries with any such Bank or Trust Company, shall be exempt from
all other provisions and requirements of this Act.]
(b) Any trustee subject to this Act who fails to file a copy of the trust
instrument providing for his title, powers or duties as required in para-
graph (a) of this section, shall be subject to a fine of not less than $500 nor
more than $10,000, or a prison term of not more than one year, or both.
SECTION 7. (a) Except as otherwise provided, every trustee subject to
this Act shall, in addition to filing copies of the instruments previously
required, file with the Attorney General periodic written reports under
oath, setting forth information as to the nature of the assets held for char-
itable purposes and the administration thereof by the trustee, in accord-
ance with rules and regulations of the Attorney General.
(b) The Attorney General shall make rules and regulations as to the
time for filing reports, the contents thereof, and the manner of executing
and filing them. He may classify trusts and other relationships concerning
property held for a charitable purpose as to purpose, nature of assets,
duration of the trust or other relationship, amount of assets, amounts to be
devoted to charitable purposes, nature of trustee, or otherwise, and may
establish different rules for the different classes as to time and nature of
the reports required to the ends (1) that he shall receive reasonably cur-
rent, periodic reports as to all charitable trusts or other relationships of a
similar nature, which will enable him to ascertain whether they are being
properly administered, and (2) that periodic reports shall not unreason-
ably add to the expense of the administration of charitable trusts and simi-
lar relationships. The Attorney General may suspend the filing of reports
as to a particular charitable trust or relationship for a reasonable, specif-
ically designated time upon written application of the trustee filed with
the Attorney General and after the Attorney General has filed in the
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register of charitable trusts a written statement that the interests of the
beneficiaries will not be prejudiced, thereby and that periodic reports are
not required for proper supervision by his office.
(c) A copy of an account filed by the trustee in any court having juris-
diction of the trust or other relationship; if the account has been approved
by the court in which it was filed, may be filed as a report required by
this section.
(d) The first report for a trust or similar relationship hereafter estab-
lished, unless the filing thereof is suspended as herein provided, shall be
filed not later than one year after any part of the income or principal is
authorized or required to be applied to a charitable purpose. If any part
of the income or principal of a trust previously established is authorized
or required to be applied to a charitable purpose, at the time this Act takes
effect, the first report, unless the filing thereof is suspended, shall be filed
within 6 months after the effective date of this Act.
(e) The periodic reporting provisions of this Act do not apply to any
trustee of a trust which is the subject matter of an adversary proceeding
pending in a court of competent jurisdiction in this State. However, upon
commencement of the proceeding the trustee shall file a report with the
Attorney General informing him of that fact together with the title and
number of the cause and the name of the court. Upon entry of final de-
cree in the cause the trustee shall in like manner report that fact to the
Attorney General.
(f) Any trustee subject to this Act who fails to file a periodic written
report as required by this section, or who submits false information in such
a report, shall be subject to a fine of not less than $500 nor more than
$10,000, or a prison term of not more than one year, or both.
sEcrION 9. (a) The Attorney General may investigate transactions and
relationships of trustees subject to this Act for the purpose of determining
whether the property held for charitable purposes is properly adminis-
tered. He may require any agent, trustee, fiduciary, beneficiary, institu-
tion, association, or corporation, or any person to appear, at a named time
and place, in the county designated by the Attorney General, where the
person resides or is found, to give information under oath and to produce
books, memoranda, papers, documents of title and evidence of assets, lia-
bility, receipts, or disbursements in the possession or control of the person
ordered to appear.
(b) Any trustee subject to this Act who is found to have intentionally
and materially violated his fiduciary responsibility to the intended bene-
ficiaries of the trust, shall be subject to.a fine of not less than $1,000 nor
more than $10,000, or a prison term ofinot less than six months nor more
than three years, or both.
SECTION 10. When the Attorney General requires the attendance of any
person, as provided in Section 9, he shall issue an order setting forth the
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time when and the place where attendance is required and shall cause the
same to be served upon the person in the manner provided for service of
process in civil cases at least 14 days before the date fixed'for attendance.
Such order shall have the same force and effect as a subpoena and, upon
application of the Attorney General, obedience to the order may be en-
forced by any court having jurisdiction of charitable trusts in the county
where the person receiving it resides or is found, in the same manner as
though the notice were a subpoena. Such court may, in case of contumacy
or refusal to obey the order issued by the Attorney General, issue an or-
der requiring such person to appear before the Attorney General or to
produce documentary evidence, if so ordered, or to give evidence touch-
ing the matter in question, and any failure to obey such order of the court
may be punished by that court as a contempt upon itself. The investiga-
tion or hearing may be made by or before any Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral designated in writing by the Attorney General to conduct such in-
vestigation or hearing on his behalf. Witnesses ordered to appear shall be
paid the same fees and mileage as are paid witnesses in the circuit courts
of this State, and witnesses whose depositions are taken and the persons
having the same shall severally be entitled to the same fees as are paid for
like services in the circuit courts of this State. The Attorney General or
the Assistant Attorney General acting in his behalf is empowered to ad-
minister the necessary oath or affirmation to such witnesses.
SECTION 11. Subject to reasonable rules and regulations adopted by the
Attorney General, the register, copies of instruments and reports filed
with the Attorney General shall be open to public inspection.
sECToN 12. (a) The Attorney General may institute appropriate pro-
ceedings to secure compliance with this Act and to secure the proper
administration of any trust or other relationship to which this Act applies.
Nothing in this Act confers on the Attorney General any additional pow-
ers to administer, supervise, or direct the administration of charitable
trusts.
(b) A suit to secure the proper administration of any trust or other re-
lationship to which this Act applies may be brought in the name of the
State by any ten or more interested parties.
(c) An "interested party," as used in paragraph (b) of this Section,
shall include a donor to the trust or a member or prospective member of
the class for the benefit of 'whom the trust was established.
SECTION 13. This Act shall apply regardless of any contrary provisions
of any instrument.
SECTION 14. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect
other provisions or applications of the Act which can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions
of this Act are severable.
